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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: SUBCONTRACTORS AND
PRIVITY
JOHN W. WHELAN* and GEORGE H. GNOSS**
INTRODUcTION
The subject of subcontractors under Government contracts is not a
novel one in a law review article; there have been several good articles.'
It is not the purpose of this paper to review all the ground so ably
discussed in these articles, but rather to attempt a general statement of
the position of the subcontractor and to suggest that it is equitable
for him to be allowed direct remedial recourse against the Govern-
ment. The function of the subcontractor is suggested by his name: he
does part of the work, furnishes materials or labor, or does other things
necessary to enable the prime contractor to fulfill his obligation to the
Government. I think the reader will accept without proof that federal
subcontractors are important to the general economy whether as em-
ployers of labor or distributors of funds. In the technical legal phrase-
ology adopted from judicial concepts, they do not have "privity" with
the federal government, that is they have not made a contract with the
Government and thus, absent some special circumstances, they have no
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
** Third year student, University of California at Davis, student assistant to Prof.
Whelan, Managing Editor, UCD Law Review.
1. Penne, Legal Remedies of the Govermnent Subcontractor, 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1958); and the following series of articles appearing in 16 FEo. B.J. (1956); Elliot,
Subcontracting Under General Services Administration Programs, 16 FED. B.J. 183
(1956); Minsch, Subcontracting In the Atomic Energy Program, 16 FED. B.J. 190
(1956); Steele, Choice of Law, State or Federal, In Govermnent Contracts, 16 FED.
B.J. 202 (1956); Wesselink, Effect of Subcontractor's Default on Prime Contractor's
Responsibilities To The Government, 16 FED. B.J. 211 (1956); Sass, Subcontractor's
Claims Against the Government, 16 FED. B.J. 232 (1956); Welch, G. A. 0. and Sub-
contractor's Claims Against The Government, 16 FED. B.J. 240 (1956); Cuneo, Dis-
putes Between Sztbcontractor and Prime Contractor, 16 FED. B.J. 246 (1956); Easter-
wood, Miller Act Problems, 16 FED. B.J. 264 (1956); Odom, Current Congressional
Attitudes Affecting Small Business And The Subcontractor, 16 FED. B.J. 274 (1956);
Rasor, Cost Controls Applied to Subcontractors, 16 FED. B.J. 301 (1956); Olverson,
Termination of Subcontractors, 16 FED. B.J. 313 (1956); Moss, Consequences of Prime
Contractors Bankruptcy, 16 FED. B.J. 323 (1956); Gantt, Labor Provisions of Govern-
ment Contracts and Subcontracts, 16 FED. B.J. 331 (1956); Shnitzer, Assignment of
Claims Arising Out of Government Contracts, 16 FED. B.J. 377 (1956); and Haas, An
Appeal Board Views Contract Claims, 16 FED. B.J. 401 (1956).
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right or claim against it. Further, from the standpoint of administration,
the Government relies on the management abilities of its prime contractor
to coordinate and articulate the work of subcontractors who may, in a
complex procurement, be arranged in tiers (or perhaps "cascades") for
the performance of the task for which the Government has agreed to
pay the prime.2 But, lack of "privity," useful as it may be to the Gov-
ernment as a defense against direct subcontractor claims, does not al-
ways provide the subcontractor with a shelter against Government ac-
don. Statutes, regulations, and contract terms give the Government
rights against subcontractors which, in the case of many subcontracts,
make the "wall of privity" rather like a one-way swiss cheese or per-
haps more aptly, like one of those walls used in experimentation with
radioactive materials through which the experimenter can act by means
of remote-control devices all the while being shielded by the wall from
the effects of radiation.
DEFINITION OF THE TERm SUBCONTRACTOR
One of the initial problems met in any discussion of "subcontractors"
is the fact that there is no general consistency in the use of the term.
This is not, of course, a necessarily bad thing, but the existence of the
inconsistency has to be observed. In addition, it has to be stated clearly
that the term "subcontractor" is used with relative precision in certain
contexts. For example, some statutes specify who, for their purposes,
will be deemed a subcontractor. The Subcontractors' Anti-Kickback
Act, 41 U.S.C. sections 51-54 (aimed at preventing subcontractors from
remitting part of the subcontract price as a condition for getting the
subcontract) provides that:
For the purpose of sections 51-54 of this title, the term "sub-
contractor" is defined as any person, including a corporation, part-
nership, or business association of any kind, who holds an agree-
ment or purchase order to perform all or any part of the work or
to make or to furnish any article or service required for the per-
formance of a negotiated contract or of a subcontract entered into
thereunder; .... 3
2. I was once told that one of the Army tank procurements in the early 1950s in-
volved over 3,000 subcontracts and purchase orders. I assume that some of the aero-
space procurements of the present day are at least as complex.
3. § 2, 74 Star. 740 (1960), 41 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). One might, just to illustrate how
privity is unimportant here, quote the following section of the Subcontractors' Anti-
Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. § 53 (1964):
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Another, and broader, definition of "subcontract" has been issued by
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor
for purposes of the Equal Employment Opportunity Program:
(w) The term "subcontract" means any agreement or arrange-
ment between a contractor and any person (in which the parties
do not stand in the relationship of an employer and an employee):
(1) For the furnishing of supplies or services or for the use
of real or personal property, including lease arrangements, which
in whole or in part, is necessary to the performance of any one
or more contracts; or
(2) Under which any portion of the contractor's obligation
under any one or more contracts is performed, undertaken, or
assumed.4
Other definitions can be found in statutes or regulations.5
Same; power of General Accounting Office
For the purpose of ascertaining whether such fees, commissions, compen-
sation, gifts, or gratuities have been paid or granted by a subcontractor,
the General Accounting Office shall have the power to inspect the
plants and to audit the books and records of any prime contractor or
subcontractor engaged in the performance of a negotiated contract.
I do not mean to raise any doubt about the propriety of such an implementing pro-
vision or its necessity in the light of the policy involved. It does show that the
subcontractor is subjected to certain liabilities by statute that even such an economic
giant as General Motors would have to bargain for. Of course, GM, as subcontractor,
would undoubtedly be subject to the above section.
4. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(w), 33 Fed. Reg. 7804, 7805 (1968), amending earlier regu-
lations. For purposes of the regulations a "contract" means any Government contract
or any federally assisted construction contract. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(f), 33 Fed. Reg.
7805 (1968). The Department of Labor acquires by contract clause the right to ex-
amine contractors' and subcontractors' books and records, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4 sub (5),
sub (7) (1968). These regulations, it might be pertinent to observe, are not issued
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-
2000d-4, but under the authority of E. 0. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). The
Equal Employment Opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 78
Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1964), recognized the existence, inde-
pendent of the Act, of Presidential programs for equal employment opportunity un-
der Government contracts, see § 709(d), 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d)
(1964). (E. 0. 11246, supra, is the successor of E. 0. 10925 mentioned in § 709(d),
supra).
5. Perhaps the most elaborate is the definition in § 103(g), Renegotiation Act of
1951, 65 Stat. 8 (1956), as inended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1213(g) (1964).
(g) Subcontract.
The term "subcontract" means-
(1) any purchase order or agreement (including purchase orders or
agreements antedating the related prime contract or higher tier sub-
[Vol. 10:80
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In general usage, apart from contract with the United States, the term
has a fairly well-accepted meaning when applied to construction con-
tracts. It indicates those who undertake performance of a part of a
prime or higher tier subcontract." As so used, it is ordinarily distin-
guished from those who are classed as "laborers" or "materialmen."
Purchase order "vendors" are often put in a separate category; this
usage is also common in connection with other contracts. 7 The precise
contract) to perform all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish
any materials, required for the performance of any other contract or
subcontract, but such term does not include any purchase order or agree-
ment to furnish office supplies;
(2) any contract or arrangement covering the right to use any patented
or secret method, formula, or device for the performance of a contract
or subcontract; and
(3) any contract or arrangement (other than a contract or arrange-
ment between two contracting parties, one of whom is found by the
Board to be a bona fide executive officer, partner, or full-time employee
of the other contracting party) under which-
(A) any amount payable is contingent upon the procurement of a
contract or contracts with a Department or of a subcontract or sub-
contracts; or
(B) any amount payable is determined with reference to the amount
of a contract or contracts with a Department or of a subcontract or
subcontracts; or
(C) any part of the services performed or to be performed con-
sists of the soliciting, attempting to procure, or procuring a contract
or contracts with a Department or a subcontract or subcontracts.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed (i) to affect in any way the
validity or construction of provisions in any contract with a Department
or any subcontract, heretofore at any time or hereafter made, prohibiting
the payment of contingent fees or commissions; or (ii) to restrict in any
way the authority of the Board to determine the nature or amount of
selling expense under subcontracts as defined in this subsection, as a proper
element of the contract price or as a reimbursable item of cost, under
a contract with a Department or a subcontract.
Other definitions can be found in Armed Services Procurement Regulation 8-101.24,
32 C.F.R. § 8.101-24; Atomic Energy Commission Procurement Regulation § 9-1.254,
41 C.F.R. § 9-1.254. See also Federal Procurement Regulation § 1-8.101(v), 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-8.101(v), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procurement Regu-
lations § 8.101-23, 41 C.F.R. § 18-8.101-23. Hereinafter, these regulations will be re-
ferred to as "ASPR", "AECPR", "FPR", and "NSAPR!" respectively. ASPR is found
in 32 C.F.R., the FPR in Chapter 1, AECPR in Chapter 9, and NASAPR in Chapter
18 of 41 C.F.R.
6. See 17 CJ.S. Contracts § 11 (1963).
7. An interesting example of construction usage can be found in Wfrells-Stewart
Construction Co. v. Martin Marietta Corporation 101 Ariz. 554, 422 P.2d 119 (1968)
where the court in discusing the rights of a subcontractor's materialman under a con-
struction contractor's bond, remarked:
Appellants argue that Martin is a "materialman of a materialman," and
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scope of the term is also important under section 2 of the Miller Act,
relating to the rights of materialmen, persons furnishing labor and con-
tractors with subcontractors under construction contract payment
bonds."
In other areas of contracting, the term "subcontractor" is quite broad
and seems to sweep in purchase order vendors, suppliers, providers of
services, and others." It is in this broad sense that the term ordinarily is
used in this article, except in those cases where a more restricted or
technical meaning is indicated.
THE "WALL OF PRIVITY" AS A JUDICIAL CONCEPT
We tend, probably rightly, to equate rights under a contract with
rights to judicial enforcement of the contract or with some of the
valuable promises in it. It is normally said that the parties to a contract
and those in privity may enforce it.1° "Privity" does not now mean, as
apparently it once may have, that a plaintiff to sue must have paid con-
sideration for the defendant's promise which he seeks to enforce. The
third party beneficiary cases seem adequately to have exploded that
not a materialman of a subcontractor, and therefore not covered by the
bond. Appellants base this position on the fact that Wells ordered the
guard-rail from Arizona Pete by a "purchase order" which is a document
ordinarily used to buy material rather than to contract for work. How-
ever, it is admitted that the purchase order was "for the furnishing and
installation of 'Road Guard' (guard-rail) and guide posts C.I.P. (Complete
In Place)." Labelling a contract "Purchase Order" does not make it any
the less a contract. A document is what its contents make it, not what it
is labelled. Kintner v. Wolfe, 102 Ariz. 164, 426 P.2d 798. A subcontractor
is one who contracts for the performance of an act, with a person who
has already contracted for its performance. Staley v. New, 56 N.M. 756,
250 P.2d 893. If Wells had contracted with Arizona Pete only for the fur-
nishing of guard-rail which Wells intended to install itself, and if Arizona
Pete had merely bought the guard-rail from Martin in order to resell to
Wells, that would be a case of a "materialman of a materialman," and re-
covery would have to be denied. But the situation in the instant case is
clearly one where Arizona Pete was a subcontractor, and Martin "sup-
plied such subcontractor with material" so that Martin is covered by that
provision of the bond. Id. at 121.
The term "Arizona Pete" does not refer to a desert badman, but instead to the
Arizona Petroleum and Asphalt Co. Id. at 120.
8. 49 Stat. 794 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1964). See, e.g., MacEvoy Co.
v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944). For a general discussion of the problem, see
Ganr, Wallick, Proctor, Problems of Private Claimants under Miller Act Payment
Bonds, 9 WM. & MARY L. Rrv. 1077, 1087-93 (1968).
9. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 1 (1963).
10. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 518a (1963).
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notion." "Privity" might therefore be said to include third party bene-
ficiaries. Then too, "real party in interest" statutes12 should have some
play: presumably they permit people other than signatories to claim
enforcement rights under an original contract. Assignees of contract
rights have generally recognized rights to sue on the contract. The con-
tent of "privity" remains a puzzling thing. As Corbin observes:
The mystery surrounding 'obligation' is the same mystery that
surrounds 'privity'; the latter term may be used to mean nothing
11. See, for a discussion, 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 124 (1950). The "third party bene-
ficiary" doctrine was used by a subcontractor against the United States in Maneely
v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929). In that case, the contract with the prime
contractor contained the following termination clause:
Abandonment of work, by contracting officer.-If conditions should arise
which in the opinion of the contracting officer make it advisable or nec-
essary to cease work under this contract, the contracting officer may aban-
don the work and terminate this contract. In such case the contracting
officer shall assume and become liable for all such obligations, commit-
iaents, and unliquidated claims as the contractor may have theretofore,
in good faith, undertaken or incurred in connection with said work....
Id. at 625.
This clause was held to constitute a promise for the benefit of the third party sub-
contractor. A later Government termination clause, evidently intended to restrict
the liability of the Government to subcontractors, included the following: (1) it
gave the Government the right to terminate the contract, (2) required the prime
contractor upon receipt of notice of termination to terminate all subcontracts, (3)
required the prime contractor to assign to the Government all its right, title and
interest under terminated subcontracts, and (4) required the prime contractor to settle
all claims arising out of the termination of subcontracts "with the approval and
ratification of the contracting officer to the extent he may require." In Daniel Hamm
Drayage Co. v. Willson, 178 F.2d 633 (8th cir, 1949), this language was held to be
a contract for the benefit of the subcontractors, the third party beneficiaries, al-
though it is the opinion of the author that the language of the contract was language
of assignment and not the traditional third party beneficiary language. Today the
standard termination clauses in Government contracts have been changed even more
in an attempt to preclude Government liability on a third party beneficiary theory.
Consider the following ASPR regulation concerning the termination for convenience
clause:
(b) In giving the Government the right to require the assignment of
the prime contractor's interest in terminated subcontracts, the termination
clauses set forth in Part 7 of this Section also provide that the Government
shall have the right, in its discretion, to settle and pay any or all claims
arising out of the termination of such subcontracts. This right does not
obligate the Government to settle and pay termination claims of sub-
contractors. As a general rule, the prime contractor is obligated to settle
and pay such claims .... ASPR 8-209.8.
12. For an example of such a statute, see CALIOaRNIA CODE OF CIVr PROCaorR,
367; (1872) aS amended (1880); VA. CODE S 8-93.1 (1950).
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW10
more than that one person is under an obligation to another. When
so used and defined, it leads to the argument most favored of all
men, the argument in a circle.' 3
To say that "privity" means only what we say it means probably does
involve the logical circle; but that only makes it illogical not neces-
sarily unwise. To make another metaphor, perhaps it is indeed judicious
to fill the bottle of privity a little bit at a time as we find something
we need to include. Surely, notions of privity have not much em-
barrassed courts faced with a need to find manufacturers liable for de-
fective products which are injurious to the persons, property, or even
economic interests of ultimate consumers or other persons.'4 It seems
not unfair to conclude that the United States might, as a buyer of
goods, be able to claim the expanded rights of a purchaser, recognized
in this sweeping new law of "product liability," without reference to
notions of privity.
But it seems to remain clear that, no matter what may happen in
the general law by way of adding new content to "privity" or by way
of brushing that notion aside on account of the necessities of social and
economic organization, the function of privity is important when sub-
contractors are claiming rights against the Government. Partly, this
is due to the idea of sovereign immunity and inferences therefrom that
13. 4 CoRBIN, CoNmAcrs S 778 (1950). Corbin concludes the paragraph from which
the language in the text was quoted by saying: "The mystery of 'privity' remains; but
it is no longer of much interest because court action is not much influenced by it."
Alas, one might wish this were true in Government contracts cases.
14. The whole law of "products liability" is in a very volatile state. I do not in-
tend to summarize it here. But the very recent developments seem to have begun
vith the Henningsen case in New Jersey (Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)); and to have reached a highwater mark in the Santor
case in the same state (Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965)) where a manufacturer of a carpet was held liable to the ultimate buyer be-
cause the carpet was defective. There was no personal injury or injury to property.
This "economic loss" notion has been rejected in at least one state, California, Seelev v.
White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). The law of product liability
may be regarded as a branch of tort law, see RESTATEMENT TORTS 2d, § 402 A (1965).
but "privity" of contracts is often clearly disavowed, see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
1ll.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), and the UNiFORM COMMERCiAL CODE sets aside
privity in certain warranty actions where a person in the family or household
of the buyer is injured. U.C.C. § 2-318. We ought to observe that the title to the sec-
tion describes such a person as a "third party beneficiary" although the last sentence
of the section ("a seller may not include or limit the operation of this section.")
seems to reveal that the nature of the "third party beneficiary's" rights are statutory.
not contractual.
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statutes surrendering such immunity ought to be strictly construed.";
The Tucker Act, for example,"6 permits suits in the Court of Claims
and the U.S. District Courts founded on any "express or implied con-
tract with the United States." This means that subcontractors have no
right to bring suit under this Act against the United States for the
reason that they have no contract, express or implied, with it.17 This
seems to amount to "no privity." Quite the most striking case, though it
is an old one, is Merritt v. United States.:' Merritt had made a subcon-
tract with Panama Knitting Mills to furnish khaki which the Mills were
to furnish to the Government at $3.20 a yard. Whether the Mills were
to do anything further to the khaki before turning it over to the Gov-
ernment does not appear. In 1919, the contract between the Govern-
ment and the Mills was cancelled under an agreement whereby the
Government took half the original amount of khaki at the contract
rate ($3.20) plus carrying charges. The Mills told Merritt that the
Government had compelled a settlement on the basis of $2.50 a yard
plus carrying charges and induced him to grant a release on that basis.
When the Government heard of this, it made the Mills pay it back
the difference between the actual basis of settlement between it and
the Mills ($3.20) and what would have been paid if the Mills had
settled with the Government at the $2.50 figure. Merritt sued the
United States to recover what the Government had received from the
Mills. Justice Brandeis declined to allow Merritt to recover:
Plaintiff cannot recover under the Tucker Act. . . . The peti-
tion does not allege any contract, express or implied in fact, by
the Government with the plaintiff to pay the latter for the khaki
on any basis. Nor does it set forth facts from which such a con-
tract will be implied. The pleader may have intended to sue for
money had and received. But no facts are alleged which afford
any basis for a claim that the repayment by the mills was exacted
by the Government for the benefit of the plaintiff. The Tucker
Act does not give a right of action against the United States in
15. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
16. 62 Star. 940 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(4) (conferring jurisdiction on the Court
of Claims, 62 Star. 933 (1948), as avnended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964) (conferring
jurisdiction on the District Courts where the claim does not exceed $10,000 in amount.).
17. See United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 737 (1944); Nickel v. Pollia, 179 F.2d 160
(10th Cir. 1950).
18. 267 U.S. 338 (1925).
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those cases where, if the transaction were between private parties,
recovery could be had upon a contract implied in law.19
Clearly, the situation was out of the ordinary.20 But the language used
gives one a rather clear sense of the claims position of the subcontractor
if he attempts to sue the United States in his own right.
But, as our legal experience should have taught us, the mere fact that
a litigant cannot do something directly does not really mean that he
may not be entitled to have an indirect recourse. Why, for example,
if a subcontractor was compelled to do extra work by reason of Gov-
ernment action or inaction should he not ask the prime contractor to
sue in its own name? Surely if the sub is entitled to claim damages or
the cost of the extra work from the prime, the prime should be entitled,
after paying the sub, to present a claim for the appropriate amount to
the Government. Or, more simply, the prime might sue the Govern-
ment at the sub's behest, allowing the sub to have control over the
litigation as the real party in interest.2 And it is quite feasible that this
same thing could be done for a sub-sub-contractor. 2 This approach, al-
lowing the prime to act as apparent principal but actual agent,-or, as it
might be called, the "good shepherd" approach-has been given general
approval for many years.2 The "good shepherd" approach is also fol-
lowed in cases of appeals by primes in behalf of subcontractors under
the "Disputes" clause in Government contracts.2 4
19. Id. at 340-41.
20. Merritt would seem to have had a fraud claim against Panama Knitting Mills
(unless, of course, Merritt had been unusually gullible). I have no information on
whether the Mills had become insolvent or otherwise useless to Merritt as the object
of a lawsuit.
21. The "real party in interest" analysis seems to be ruled out in Severin v. United
States, 99 Ct. CI. 435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1944), discussed infra.
22. See Livingston v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 625 (1944).
23. At least since Stout v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 385 (1892). See also United
States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 737 (1944).
24. This is a remedy allowing decision of disputed questions by the Contracting
Officer and an appeal from his decision to a Board of Contract Appeals set up within
the executive agency which made the contract. The remedy is based on a prime con-
tract clause, called the "Disputes" clause (for the text of the clause, see Art. 12 U.S.
Standard Form 32, FPR 1-16.901-32, and also ASPR 7-103.12). Generally speaking, such
"Disputes" provisions (under which the Government's Contracting Officer decides
which disputes and appeals may be taken to the Government agency) are not author-
ized for inclusion in subcontracts. See ASPR 23-203(a), quoted infra. However, the
Atomic Energy Commission uses such a clause; for text see 10 C.F.R. Chap. 1, part
3, App. A. Except as thus provided, the subcontractor has no right to appeal to the
Board of Contract Appeals in his own name. For the Government to be bound to
such a clause (i.e., for the Contracting Officer to be bound to decide and the Board
[Vol. 10: 80
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There are some limitations on this approach, of course. For, example,
if the prime contractor should refuse to act as shepherd, this presum-
to hear and decide appeals) it must obviously give its consent to the clause in the
subcontract. The prime and the sub cannot impose such responsibilities on the prime
by their own action, unaided by Government consent. See TRW, Inc., ASBCA No.
11373, 68-2 BCA para. 7099 (1968). That decision also indicates that Government "ap-
proval" of a subcontract containing a clause imposing disputes decision responsibilities
on the Government Contracting Officer and the contracting agency on appeal, did
not give the sub any direct appeal right. But see Federal Telephone and Radio Co.,
ASBCA 4691, 59-1, BCA para. 2246 (1959).
The "good shepherd" approach is, however, still available. That is, the prime can
appeal on behalf of the sub. See the discussion of some of the complicated issues
which may arise, in TRW, Inc., ASBCA No. 11373, 66-2 BCA 5847 (1966), motion
for reconsideration denied 66-2 BCA 5882 (1966). (This case resulted ultimately in
the decision in 68-2 BCA para. 7099, cited supra, this note). See also the discussion
in Holder Constr. Co. GSBCA No. 1913, 68-1 BCA 7072 (1968), denying motion
for reconsideration of 67-2 BCA 6397.
Because of its clear policy statement affecting some of the problems just discussed
and related problems, there is included the provisions of ASPR 23-203:
REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACTS
23-203 Disputes and Arbitration Provisions in Subcontracts.
(a) Consent by the contracting officer to a subcontract does not consti-
tute approval of the terms and conditions of the subcontract. Nevertheless,
the contracting officer shall not consent to a provision in the subcontract
purporting to give the subcontractor the right to obtain a direct decision of
the contracting officer of the right of direct appeal to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals. The Government is entitled to the management
services of the prime contractor in adjusting disputes between himself and
his subcontractors. The contracting officer should act only in disputes aris-
ing under the prime contract, and then only with and through the prime
contractor, even if a subcontractor is affected by the dispute between the
Government and the prime contractor. The contracting officer shall not
participate in disputes between a prime contractor and his subcontractors.
(b) However, the contracting officer should not refuse consent to a
subcontract, particularly under a cost-reimbursement contract, merely be-
cause it contains a clause giving the subcontractor, if he is affected by a
dispute arising under the prime contract, an indirect appeal to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals through assertion of the prime con-
tractor's right to take such an appeal, or through prosecution of such an
appeal by the prime contractor on behalf of the subcontractor. Such a
clause must not attempt to obligate the contracting officer or the Board
to decide questions which do not arise between the Government and the
prime contractor or which are not cognizable under the "Disputes" clause
of the prime contract, and must not attempt to obligate the contracting
officer to notify or deal directly with the subcontractor. However, such
a clause may appropriately provide that the prime contractor and sub-
contractor shall be equally bound by the contracting officer's or the
Board's decision on a dispute.(c) The prime contractor and his subcontractor may agree to settle dis-
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [
ably would leave the subcontractor without a forum except to the ex-
tent that he could sue the prime. Whether the subcontractor by some
sort of equitable proceeding could compel the prime to take the ap-
peal or present the claim in its own name is a most interesting question.25
Or, if the prime contractor should act without diligence so that its own
position as litigant became time-barred, this presumably would prevent
it from shepherding the subcontractor's claim into the appropriate
forum.a6 There are undoubtedly other occasions where good shepherd-
ing will not suffice.17
But the principal exception has been that expressed in the so-called
"Severin" rule."8 The general problem is: what effect is to be given to
putes by arbitration. The results of such arbitration and the cost resulting
therefrom, however, are no more binding on the Government than are the
results of a judicial determination or a voluntary settlement; they are sub-
ject to independent review and approval under the prime contract. The
contracting officer shall not consent to provisions in subcontracts purport-
ing to make the results of arbitration (or judicial determinations or volun-
tary settlements) binding on the Government.
A similar provision is contained in NASA PR 3-903-5.
25. I know of no authority. However, if the subcontract contained release provisions
like some of those mentioned in the quotation from the Simmons case (see the text
below), where the prime is liable to the sub for Government-caused damages only
when, as and if the prime receives payment from the Government, the subcontractor
might well argue that its only adequate remedy would be an order by a State or
Federal court directing the prime to sue as "good shepherd" in the Court of Claims
or the U.S. District Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. S§ 1491, 1326(a) (2) (1964).
Petition for such an order and the suit by the prime contractor pursuant to the order
might be consolidated in the District Court provided the claim by the prime against
the Government did not exceed $10,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964).
26. See, e.g., Piracci Const. Co., ASBCA No. 10736, 66-1 BCA 5324 (1966) where
the prime failed to take a disputes appeal (see note 24, supra) on behalf of the sub
within the thirty-day period provided in the dispute clause. For a cliffhanger, see
Dinger Contracting Co., DOT CAB Nos. 67-46, 67-46A, 68-2BCA 7144 (1968).
27. For example, the prime contractor may forward the subcontractor's claim even
though the prime does not believe the subcontractor has a valid claim. This was the
case in Main Cornice Works, Inc., ASBCA No. 9856, 65-1 BCA 4577 (1964), in
which the prime contractor presented the subcontractor's claim with the admission
that it was merely ministerially forwarding the claim for "the attention it merits."
The Board denied the appeal and in doing so said that the attitude of the prime
"raises the question whether there is any dispute at all between the appellant and
the Government." To avoid the problems associated with the prime contractor acting
as shepherd for the subcontractor, a subcontractor may bargain for an arbitration
clause in the contract between the prime and the subcontractor. There is, however,
no evidence of extensive use of arbitration clauses by prime and subcontractors. 7
CCH GOVtERNMENr CoNrTRAcrs RmOR=R 90,060.
28. Based on the holdings in: Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943), cert.
denied 322 U.S. 733 (1944); Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United
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language in the agreement between the prime and the subcontractor
by which the prime is relieved of liability to the subcontractor for the
sort of claim which the subcontractor seeks to press through the prime?
Thus, if the Government's conduct has delayed the subcontractor who,
seeks damages therefor, what effect should be given to a clause in the
subcontract like the following:
21st. The Contractor or Subcontractor shall not in any event be
held responsible for any loss, damate [sic], detention or delay
caused by the Owner or any other Subcontractor upon the build-
ing; or delays in transportation, fire, strikes, lockouts, civil or mili-
tary authority, or by insurrection or riot, or by any other cause
beyond the control of Contractor or Subcontractor, or in any
event for consequential damages.2
It seems reasonably consistent with the "privity" idea summarized
previously to say that the prime must have some basis for suing the
Government in order for him to press the sub's claim at all. And if the
prime is not liable to the subcontractor, then the prime would seem to
have no basis for suing the Government. That at least seems to have
been the feeling of the Court of Claims in the Severin cases.ao In J. L.
States, 81 F. Supp. 595 (Ct. Cl. 1949); Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 203 (Ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963 (1952);
Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 892
(Cr. Cl. 1953). The cases involved construction contracts between the Severin trustees
and the Government for various construction projects. The first case, cited above
dealt with a post office at Rochester; the second and fourth decisions dealt with a
housing project in Indianapolis and the third decision with a housing project in At-
lanta. In all of the cases there was contained in subcontracts substantially the same
exculpatory clause. All of the cases were concerned, at least in part with subcon-
tractors' claims against the "Owner" in the above clause (that is, the U.S.) for
various delays and the like. The subcontractors sought to press the claims through
the Severins (or the Bank, as trustees of the Severin estates). For law review coverage,
see Hubbard, The Severin Doctrine, 10 MILITARY L. REv. 191 (1960); Penne, Legal
Remedies of the Govermnent Subcontractor, 32 So. CALi. L. REv. (1958), reprinted in,
1 YEARBOOK OF PRocuREMENT ARTicLss 471 (1966).
29. This clause was taken from the Severin case, 99 Ct. CI. 435, 440, 443. See also
Continental Illinois Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. v. U.S. 112 Ct. Cl. 563, 564 (1949); 121 Ct. Cl.
203, 233, 244 (1952), cert. den. 343 U.S. 963 (1952); 126 Ct. Cl. 631, 680 (1953).
30. And also in James Stewart and Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 653 (Ct. CI.
1946). It might be interesting to note that there seems to have been some regret about
the first Severin opinion by the Judge who wrote it (Judge Madden). He expressed
the feeling that the decision in United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 737 (1944) was
contrary to his own analysis and that on the whole, his original decision ought to be
set aside. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp.
563 (Ct. Cl. 1949). This feeling probably did not survive denial of certiorari in the
1968]
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Simmons Company, Inc. v. United States, the court summarized its
complicated rulings:
Since our decision in the Severin case, supra, this court has
repeatedly delineated the only grounds upon which a prime con-
tractor may sue the Government for damages incurred by one
of its subcontractors through the fault of the Government. The
decided cases make abundantly clear that a suit of this nature may
be maintained only when the prime contractor has reimbursed its
subcontractor for the latter's damages or remains liable for such
reimbursement in the future. These are the only ways in which
the damages of the subcontractor can become, in turn, the dam-
ages of the prime contractor, for which recovery may be had
against the Government. . . . Thus, when the subcontract con-
tains a clause completely exonerating a prime contractor from lia-
bility to its subcontractor for the damage complained of, suit
cannot be maintained by the prime contractor against the Gov-
ernment. . . . The same result will follow when the subcontract
provides for a complete release of the prime contractor's liability
to the subcontractor upon the granting of additional time for the
latter's performance, or the acceptance of final payment by the
latter. On the other hand, if the subcontract is silent as to the
ultimate liability of the prime contractor to the subcontractor for
the damages complained of, suit by the former against the Gov-
ernment in behalf of the subcontractor will generally be per-
mitted .... Lying between these extremes are those cases involv-
ing situations wherein the prime contractor has agreed to reimburse
its subcontractor for damages it has suffered at the hands of the
Government, but only as and when the former receives payment
for them from the Government. This court has expressed ihe
view that such clauses do not preclude suit by the prime con-
tractor in behalf of its subcontractor .... 31
The slow-stepping withdrawal of the Court of Claims from the absolute
third of the four decisions cited in note 28, pipra. But see Donovan Constr. Co. v.
United States, 149 F. Supp. 898, 900 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 826 (1957).
31. 304 F.2d 886, 888-89 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (citations omitted). In the Simmons case
the Court held that, absent an exculpatory clause and despite releases executed
by the claimant subcontractors, the prime remained liable to them and, hence, could
present their claim in its name, against the Government. The general tenor of the
releases was that the prime remained liable to the subcontractors at least to the extent
it could effect a recovery against the United States, see 158 Ct. CI. 393, 395-96, and
perhaps otherwise, 158 Ct. Cl. 393, 399-400.
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rigors of the Severin rule continued in the Blount Brothers cases. Again
let the court speak for itself:
As indicated previously, plaintiff rejects the assertion of de-
fendant that the Severin doctrine applies to count one of the peti-
tion. First, it is plaintiff's position that the exculpatory clause con-
tained in the subcontracts relates solely to delay damages resulting
from breaches of the contract. Secondly, according to plaintiff,
count one alleges not an action for breach of contract, but rather
a claim which comes within the terms of the contract. It follows,
under this view, that, with regard to the subject matter of count
one, plaintiff has not been relieved of liability to its subcontractor.
Therefore, plaintiff concludes that the Severin rule, which is pre-
mised upon the non-liability of the general contractor, does not
bar the present action.
The Severin doctrine has been discussed in cases involving claims
which arose under the respective contracts.... However, in each
of the cited cases, the prime contractor was permitted to maintain
an action on behalf of a subcontractor, since there was no evidence
that the prime contractor had been relieved of liability. Thus, in
neither case was the court required to construe exculpatory
language....
Defendant cites a number of decisions in which a suit for the
benefit of a subcontractor was held to be barred because the gen-
eral contractor had been absolved of liability to the subcon-
tractor. . In each of these cases, the prime contractor was at-
tempting to assert an action for breach of contract. According-to
plaintiff, the above cases are not controlling when the claim is
one coming within the terms of the prime contract.
We consider the distinction which plaintiff seeks to draw to be
valid in this case. As plaintiff points out, the exculpatory clause
was intended to insulate the general contractor from the possi-
bility of being (1) liable to the subcontractor for delay caused
by the Government, yet (2) unable to recover from the Govern-
ment. The need for such a protective clause is clear when the
contractor's remedy against the Government is an action for
breach of contract. On the other hand, the same necessity does
not exist when the contract provides that the Government will
compensate the contractor for such delay. Thus, we accept the
contention of plaintiff that the exculpatory clause did not affect
plaintiff's liability to its subcontractor insofar as claims under the
prime contract were concerned. Therefore, if the present claims
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are encompassed by the terms of plaintiff's contract with the Navy,
then the Severin rule is not a bar.3 2
The court concluded that the facts of the case indicated that there had
been a supplemental agreement (although not the usual formal one)
to reimburse the prime contractor (Blount Brothers) for costs incident
to a cessation of the work. No doubt other refinements of contract
construction will occur;38 but the most interesting point about all of
this is that such complicated rationalization should be necessary to ef-
fectuate what seems to be such a simple right. One also should observe
that these decisions may well leave the prime contractor in a very
strong bargaining position if there are other outstanding claims be-
tween himself and the subcontractor: that is, he may agree to act as
good shepherd only to the extent that the other (and possibly com-
pletely unrelated) claims are settled to his satisfaction. Certainly, too,
much litigation is preceded or accompanied by efforts on the part of
the parties to settle without prosecuting the case all the way to judg-
ment; in such a case, the prime who has claims of his own as well as
"good shepherd" claims will be less interested, one would presume,
in the latter. He may expose himself to suit by the subcontractor, it is
true; but it is also true that the expense and delay of such litigation
may induce the sub to accept an unsatisfactory settlement.3 4
32. The quotation is from the second Blount case, Blount Bros. Constr. Co.
v. United States, 348 F.2d 471, 472-74 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (Citations omitted). The first
case Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1965). 346 F.2d 962 arose out
of the same contract but dealt with different claims.
The subcontracts involved contained the following exculpatory clause:
Contractor shall not be liable to the Sub-Contractor for delay to the Sub-
Contractor's work by the act, neglect or default of the Owner, or the
Architect, or by reason of fire or other casualty, or on account of riots
or of strikes, or other combined action of the workmen or others, or on
account of any acts of God, or any other cause beyond the Contractor's
control; but the Contractor will cooperate with Sub-Contractor to enforce
any just claim against the Owner or Architect for delay.
171 Ct. Cl. 478, 483 n. 5 (1965); see 172 Ct. Cl. 1, 3 n. 1 (1965). The first Blount case
involved a claim by Blount Brothers for additional work (done by the subcontractor)
alleged to be compensable as an equitable adjustment under the terms of the contract.
The court said the exculpatory clause quoted above did not deal with such claims and:
There is no release in this case, and the subcontract is silent as to the
ultimate liability of the prime contractor to the Brown Co., Inc. on the
claim involved here. There is therefore no bar to this suit by the plaintiff.
171 Ct. Cl. 478, 483-84.
33. See, e.g., Gardner Displays Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Southern Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 439 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Beacon Constr. Co.
v. Prepakt Concrete Co. 375 F.2d 977, 981-82 (1st Cir. 1967).
34. Some of the other bargaining wheels and levers are discussed in a sprightly
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THE "WALL OF PRrviTy" AS A MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
In one sense, a Government contract can be viewed as a delegation
of responsibility to a single person or firm which is supposed to ar-
range for performance of tasks, furnishing of supplies or construction,
and whatever else is involved. It is the contractor's undertaking to per-
form the contractually delegated function and, unless stipulated to the
contrary, he may use such subcontractors, laborers, materialmen, pur-
chase order vendors, etc., as he deems useful and desirable. That is his
task and the problems35 flowing from it are his and not those of the
United States except to the extent that he fails to perform the principal
contract work or in some other ways fails to comply with his con-
tractual undertaking. That his failures may be brought about by de-
linquencies of his subcontractors is, it is said in theory, not a concern of
the Government which pays to be relieved of such concerns. Legally,
this may be true enough, but the economic and commercial conse-
quences of the contractor's actions may have to be borne by the United
States in the form of delayed deliveries or performance, increased costs,
or defective compliance with contract specifications by the contractor.
When legal theory does not follow business fact, the theory can be
expected to give a little.
This is illustrated by the following quotation:
The Government buys management from the prime contractor
along with goods and services, and places responsibility on him to
manage programs to the best of his ability, including placing and
administering subcontracts as necessary to assure performance at
the lowest overall cost to the Government. Although the Gov-
ernment does not expect to participate in every management de-
cision, it may reserve the right to review the contractor's manage-
ment efforts, including the proposed make-or-buy program.3 6
The preceding sentences were taken from the Department of Defense
regulations dealing with contractors' "make or buy" programs, that is,
programs based on the decision that the contractor shall make an item
piece by B. C. Hart, Status of the Subcontractor in Federal Government Cases-The
Surety's Point of View, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE,
AND COMPENSATION LAW, 468-75 (1965).
35. See, e.g. ASPR 23-203(a), quoted, note 24, supra, expressing Government detente
from disputes between subs and primes because of the management concept.
36. ASPR 3-.02.1 (emphasis added).
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himself or buy it from a subcontractor. The regulations are elaborate
and obviously only find real application in complex procurements. 7
Similar provisions can be found in other regulations&as In some cases,
notification of the Government or its approval of changes in make or
buy programs is required.3 9
In addition to this, the Armed Services Procurement Regulation cre-
ates a procedure for contractor procurement system review and ap-
proval or "CPSR." 40 This is not applicable to all contractors, 41 but it
is applicable to subcontractors' purchasing systems under some circum-
stances.2 Without going into the details of this procedure, it should
suffice to point out that it is a management surveillance device and obvi-
ously can have effects on the ways in which a Government prime con-
tractor handles relationships with his subcontractors and the ways in
which proposed subcontractors may operate their own purchasing sys-
tems.
43
Further, one of the important features of administration of cost-type
contracts is the determination of allowability of costs claimed by the
contractor. The principles applicable to such determination are ex-
pressed in regulations.44 A prime contractor's claimed costs will include
subcontractors' charges to him and these can be subjected to testing by
the same principles.45 Auditors can make recommendations as to the
allowance or disallowance of costs and thus produce an impact on the
cost-type prime contractor's management techniques.4 6 The Govern-
ment has audit rights and rights to examine books and records in con-
37. ASPR 3-901(a).
38. See NASA PR 3.900-3.903-50; FPR §§1-3.900-1-3.903.
39. See ASPR 3-902.4; NASA PR 3.902-1(i); FPR § 1-3.902-3.
40. ASPR Sec. XXIII, part 1.
41. Initial or annual reviews are to be made of contractors expected to have sales
to the Government during the next twelve months of more than $5,000,000 on other
than firm fixed-price contracts or fixed-price contracts with escalation (as to these
see ASPR 3-404.2, 3-404.3).
42. See ASPR 23-107.
43. The provisions of ASPR sec. XXIII, part 1 are elaborately implemented in ASPR
Supplement No. 1 (Guide for Conducting Contractor Procurement System Review),
see 4 CCH Govr CoNTRAc-rs R.oRTm % 37,350-37,379.
44. See ASPR Sec. XV; FPR 1-15.
45. See, e.g., the terms of the "Allowable Cost, Fixed-Fee, and Payment" Clause,
ASPR 7-203.4, subclause (a).
46. See ASPR 3-809 (c)(1).
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nection with many subcontracts47 and there is some evidence that it
has disallowed costs at the subcontract level.48
Somewhat different, but having a clear impact on management are
the requirements dealing with approvals of subcontracts. 49 The National
47. E.g., for cost-reimbursement contracts, see, e.g.,' ASPR 7-203.7, subclause (b)
(Comptroller General audit rights), ASPR 7-104.41(c) (contracting agency audit
rights); for negotiated fixed-price contract, see ASPR 7-104.15 (Comptroller General);
for certain fixed-price contracts, see ASPR 7-104.41(a) & (b). ASPR 7-203.7 and
7-104.15 reflect the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1964) and are paralled, pur-
suant to sec. 304(c), Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 63 Stat. 395
(1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1964), by provisions of FPR § 1-7.101-10.
ASPR 7-104.41 implements the requirements of the "Truth in Negotiation" features
of the Armed Services Procurement Act, as added by 76 Star. 528 (1962), 10 U.S.C.
§ 2306(f) (1964). This note, it should be observed, attempts to cite only a few of the
regulatory provisions relating to audit rights which may extend to subcontractors. The
provisions cited above rely on contract and subcontract clauses to confer such rights.
An interesting decision involving audit rights based on 70A Star. 132 (1956), 10 U.S.C.
§ 2313(b) (1964) and the clause included in a prime contract pursuant thereto is
Hewlett Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 988, (1968).
Direct rights (i.e., without commanding use of a contract clause) to audit in cases
of subcontracts under certain cost-type contracts are granted by 70 A Star. 132 (1956),
10 U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1964).
48. I have little .evidence of the extent to which auditors examining cost records of
subcontractors actually disallow such costs at that level (i.e. rather than informing
the prime that the sub's claimed cost will be disallowed if submitted by the prime).
But this must have occurred on some occasion. See Committee Print, Conference Re-
lating to Subcontractors' Claims, Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1963). Actually, one might expect, the spoken attitude of a Gov-
ernment auditor toward a sub's claimed cost might be very persuasive to the sub
even if no formal pronouncement of disallowance was made.
49. These approval requirements are covered, inter alia, in ASPR Sec. XXIII, part
2; NASA PR 3.903-2. Such approval regulations also include provisions which reflect
the statutory subsections requiring advance notification of certain subcontracts under
cost and cost-reimbursement prime contracts. 70A Stat. 130 (1956), as amended, 10
U.S.C. § 2306(e) ( ). Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 63 Star. 395
(1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1964). 10 U.S.C. § 2306(e) (1964) applies to
NASA, 10 U.S.C. § 2303 (a) (5) (1964). The requirement of approval is not in direct
implementation of the command in the statutory sections. ASPR contains at 7-203.8 a
clause for cost-reimbursement contracts. This implements the "notification" require-
ment of statute set out above and, additionally, requires approvals by the Contracting
Officer of subcontracts. The Contracting Officer may also approve specific subcontract
provisions under this clause, but this approval does not constitute a determination of
allowability of costs unless the CO so states. There follows the text of ASPR 23-201.1
(a) which contains a notification and approval clause for fixed-price contracts. It il-
lustrates the extent of possible control over the prime's management decisions.
23-201.1 Clause Entitled "Subcontracfs" for Fixed-Price Contracts.
(a) In fixed-price contracts (other than firm fixed-price or fixed-price
with escalation) having an estimated contract price of $1,000,000 or more
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Aeronautics and Space Administration has expressed something of the
philosophy behind such requirements:
and letter contracts contemplating any type of fixed-price contract, the
clause set forth below is required if:
(i) it is anticipated that at least one subcontract may exceed $100,000
or such lower dollar amount as is to be inserted in (b) (ii) and
(iii) of the following clause in accordance with (c) below; or
(ii) the work of the prime contractor, or of the plant or division of
the prime contractor which will perform the contract, is pre-
dominantly for the Government.
SUBCONTRACTS (APR. 1967)
(a) As used in this clause, the term "subcontract" includes purchase or-
ders.
(b) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer reasonably in
advance of entering into any subcontract if the Contractor's procurement
system has not been approved by the Contracting Officer and if the sub-
contract:
(i) is to be a cost-reimbursement, time and materials, or labor-hour con-
tract which it is estimated will involve an amount in excess of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) including any fee;
(ii) is proposed to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); or
(iii) is one of a number of subcontracts, under this contract, with a single
subcontractor for the same or related supplies or services which, in
the aggregate, are expected to exceed one hundred thousand dol-
lars ($100,000).
(c) The advance notification required by paragraph (d) above shall in-
clude:
(i) a description of the supplies or services to be called for by the sub-
contract;
(ii) identification of the proposed subcontractor and an explanation of
why and how the proposed subcontractor was selected, including
the competition obtained;
(iii) the proposed subcontract price, together with the Contractor's
cost or price analysis thereof;
(iv) the subcontractor's current, complete, and accurate cost or pricing
data and Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data, when such
data and certificates are required by other provisions of this con-
tract to be obtained from the subcontractor; and
(v) identification of the type of subcontract to be used.
(d) The Contractor shall not enter into any subcontract for which
advance notification to the Contracting Officer is required by this clause,
without the prior written consent of the Contracting Officer; provided that
the Contracting Officer, in his discretion, may ratify in writing any sub-
contract. Such ratification shall constitute the consent of the Contracting
Officer required by this paragraph.
(e) Neither consent by the Contracting Officer to any subcontract or
any provisions thereof nor approval of the Contractor's procurement sys-
tem shall be construed to be a determination of the acceptability of any
subcontract price or of any amount paid under any subcontract or to re-
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(d) The responsibility for subcontract selection, pricing, and
administration rests with the prime contractor. Contracting officers
must exercise the degree of review and surveillance necessary to
assure that the contractor's responsibilities are being discharged
effectively. Consequently, the responsibilities of contracting of-
ficers do not end with the consent to subcontracts. When a pro-
posed subcontract is of substantial magnitude, or may reasonably
be anticipated to have a significant impact on performance under
the prime contract, contracting officers must concern themselves
with the effectiveness of subcontract administration. In appropriate
circumstances, contracting officers may require, as a condition to
consent, the submission of the prime contractor's plan for adminis-
tration of the subcontract and the proposed method for measur-
ing the efficiency and effectiveness of the subcontractor in the
area of cost, quality, and schedule.50
I have no intention of raising any question about the merits of such ap-
proval requirements. Undoubtedly, they reflect the hard necessities of
doing business in increasingly complicated technological fields, but I
think that such requirements and the others briefly discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraphs do give witness to the fact that the "wall of privity"
as a management conception has a number of substantial cracks. It is
important to note with respect to privity as a judicial concept that
while these approval clauses give the Government substantial control
over making subcontracts, such control does not create a contractual
or "privity" relationship between the Government and the subcon-
tractor.r1 The converse, however, may not necessarily be true.52
SoME BREACHES IN THE "WALL"
It might be convenient to point out some of the ways by which Gov-
ernment policy, procedure, and administration has penetrated the "wall
of privity." I make no pretense that the list is complete, but I think it
is revealing about the extent to which the word "Government" has
come to be an extremely important part of the phrase "Government
contracts." What follows does not explain the full impact of any of
lieve the Contractor of any responsibility for performing this contract,
unless such approval or consent specifically provides otherwise.
(f) The Contractor agrees that no subcontract placed under this con-
tract shall provide for payment on a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost basis.
50. NASA PR 3.903-2(d).
51. See TRW, Inc., ASBCA No. 11373, 68-2 BCA 7099 (1968).
52. La Sanska v. United States, 346 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1965) (footnotes omitted).
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the policy or other requirements involved, it simply points out a major
feature and indicates in the footnotes some related details.
The right to examine books, records, papers, etc.
This right is not a new onea but it is currently of importance under
a number of statutes or regulations.54 Sometimes a statute confers rights
directly on the Government to examine subcontractors records,"5 but
in most cases the statute or regulation directs that the Government ac-
quire the right by means of contract and ("flow-down") subcontract
clauses.5"
53. See, e.g., § 1301, Second War Powers Act, 56 Star. 185 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 643 (1964).
54. Statutes, e.g., (a) the so-called "Examination of Records" Act, 70A Star. 132
(1956), 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1964); ASPR 7-104.15, sec. 304(e), Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act, 63 Star. 395 (1949), as amended 41 U.S.C. § 254(c)
(1964), FPR § 1-7.101-10; (b) § 105(e) (2); the Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 1215(e) (2) (1964) (the Renegotiation Act is effective with respect to receipts
and accruals attributable to performance before § 102(c), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1212(c),
as extended by -- Stat. - (1968); (c) Sec. 3 of the Subcontractors' Anti-Kickback
Act, 74 Star. 741, 41 U.S.C. § 53; § 705(a) (1964), Defense Production Act of 1950,
64 Star. 817 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2155 (1964) (portions of the Act,
including this section are effective until 30 June 1970, § 1, 80 Star. 279 (1968); Emer-
gency Contracts Act (or as it is often called Public Law 85 804), 72 Stat. 972, as
amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1433 (1964); 10 U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1964), giving direct access
(without clauses) to certain contractors' and subcontractors' books.
Regulations: E.g., (a) regulations under E.O. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12935, (1965), re-
quiring a central clause relating to Equal Employment Opportunities, stipulate that
the clause shall feature a "flow-down" provision for subcontracts requiring access to
books, records, etc. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(a) (5) and (7), 33 Fed. Reg. 7804, 7805 (1968);
(b) regulations issued to carry out (although not to implement an express command
of the "Truth in Negotiations" provisions added to the Armed Services Procurement
Act by 76 Stat. 528 (1962), 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) require contract and subcontract pro-
visions giving the Government access to books and records. See ASPR 7-104.41. (c)
'Similar requirements to those just mentioned (in connection with "Truth in Negotia-
tions") were added by administrative promulgation (i.e., without statute) to FPR, see
FPR 1-3.814-2.
Since this article was written, Congress has reinforced the contractual acquisition of
audit rights by an amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f), supra, which gives the contracting
agency the right (independent of contractual authorization) to inspect contractors' and
subcontractors' records. See Public Law 90-512 (1968).
55. E.g., the Renegotiation Act, supra note 54. See also Public Law 90-512, note 54,
supra. Foreign subcontractors may be exempted from examination of records provisions.
80 Star. 850 (1966), amending 10 U.S.C. § 2313b (1964), and 41 U.S.C. § 254 c (1964).
56. E.g., the "Examination of Records" Act; the Equal Employment Opportunities
Regulation, supra note 54.
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Regulation of the conditions of labor under Government contracts and
subcontracts
There are several statutes which pertain to wages, or wages and hours,
or other rights of labor under Government contracts and subcontracts.
Each statute and implementing regulation should be considered indi-
vidually to determine the scope of its application: e.g., (i) the Contract
Work Hours Standards Act,57 (ii) the Davis-Bacon Act,58 (iii) the
Service Contract Act of 1965." As to whether the Walsh-Healey Pub-
lic Contracts Act60 may be applicable in the cases of some subcon-
tracts, see interpretations of the Department of Labor.61
Debarment
One of the more rigorous methods by which the Government is
able to police enforcement of certain of the public policy and other
standards applicable to Government contracts is by "debarring" con-
tractors. In general, this means that the person or firm debarred may
not be awarded contracts for a specified period. Some statutes authorize
such debarment for violation of their provisions, other debarments are
authorized by regulation.62 Debarment does not extend to subcontracts,
but it should be noted that the regulations provide:
Where a listed concern is proposed as subcontractor, the con-
tracting officer should decline to consent to subcontracting with
such concern in any instance in which consent is required of the
Government before the subcontract is placed (see 7-203.8) un-
57. 76 Star. 357-59 (1962), 40 U.S.C. §3 327-32 (1964); See ASPR 12-300, 12-303;
ASPR 18-703.1; FPR § 1-12.300, 1-12.303, 1-12A03-1.
58. 46 Star. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-5 (1964); ASPR 18-703.1;
FPR § 1-12.403-1.
59. 79 Star. 1035-36 (1965), 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-57 (1964); ASPR XII, part 10; FPR
§ 1-12.9.
60. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964); ASPR Sec. XII, part 6; FPR § 1-12.6.
61. See FPR § 1-12.602-3.
62. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this article. But debarment is au-
thorized by the Davis-Bacon Act 46 Star. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a-
2(a) (1964), the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act § 3, 49 Star. 2037 (1936), as
anzended, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (1964), the Buy-American Act, 47 Star. 1520 (1933), as
amended, 41 U.S.C. § 10b(b) (1964) and others. Administrative debarment is based
on final conviction of certain offenses or on violation of contract provisions. These
subjects (including the subject of "ineligibility" and "suspension") may be found set
out in ASPR Sec. I, part 6, and FPR § 1-1.6.
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less the Secretary or his authorized representative determines such
placement to be in the best interest of the Government.63
Pricing control
I have included under this heading a group of diverse provisions
dealing with controlling some of the profit aspects of Government con-
tracts. I have by no means attempted to list all the devices that exist.
Perhaps the best-known statute in this field (at least among the gen-
eral public) is the Renegotiation Act of 1951.*64 This Act applies to
many defense contractors and subcontractors 5 and operates to eliminate
excessive profits from their total defense receipts and accruals from
performance during each year or other fiscal period.6 6 In cases where
the Renegotiation Act is not applicable,67 profits of contractors and
subcontractors on certain aircraft procurement and on contracts for
construction of naval vessels are subject to recapture in accordance with
the terms of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934.6" Somewhat similar to
the Vinson-Trammel Act are the provisions of section 505(b) of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936,69 applicable to contracts and subcon-
tracts for the construction of merchant ships.
Perhaps the most noted pricing-control act (at least in terms of the
frequency and heat of current discussion) is the section of the Hebert
63. ASPR 1-603 (c). See also FPR § 1-1.603 (f). "Approvals" and "consent" are dis-
cussed in the text, supra.
64. 65 Star. 7 (1951), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211-24 (1964).
65. Sec. 102(a), 50 U.S.C. App. S 1212(a) (1964).
66. The act is administered by a Renegotiation Board, which is independent of the
.contracting agencies, sec. 107, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1217 (1964). Under the Act, indi-
vidual contracts are not "repriced;" instead, the Act eliminates excessive profits from
defense business receipts and accruals. In order to be subject to the Act in a given
year, receipts and accruals have to exceed the statutory floor (currently $1,000,000
for most subcontractors, sec. 105[f], 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215[f]).
67. See sec. 102(e), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1212(e) (1964). The Renegotiation Act is not
permanent, and should it expire, the Vinson-Trammel Act would be fully applicable,
in accordance with its terms, to aircraft and naval vessel procurement. Even during
the period while the Renegotiation Act is effective, some contracts and subcontracts
may not come within its reach (see, e.g., sec. 106, Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C. App.
9 1216 (1964) and, hence, may fall within Vinson-Trammel.
68. 48 Star. 505 (1935), as amended. For current provisions, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 2382, 7300,
(Rev. 1956).
69. 49 Star. 1998 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 1155 (1936). This, like the Vinson-
Trammel Act, supra note 67, is superseded by the Renegotiation Act where ap-
plicable, see § 102(e), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1212(e) (1964).
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Act, or "Public Law 87-65311' 70 which deals with recovery of amounts
by which contract or subcontract prices were increased due to non-
current, inaccurate, or incomplete cost data which were furnished by
the contractor or subcontractor and which served as a basis for the con-
tract or subcontract price, or the price of certain contract or subcon-
tract modifications. This is widely known as the "Truth in Negotia-
tions" section71 and requires contractors and subcontractors to certify
the currency, accuracy, and completeness of cost data. No attempt will
be made here to do other than mention this section. It is rather elab-
orately implemented by clauses and regulations. 72
Certain economic policies
The Government to some extent attempts to effectuate economic
policies through contracts and subcontracts. Particularly worthy of
mention are the small business policy73 and the labor surplus area
policy.74 In addition, some economic policies affecting subcontracts
have foreign policy overtones, e.g., the Buy-American Act which gives
preference to the use of American products, materials, etc.,7 5 and the
policy relating to purchases from Communist areas.76
70. 76 Stat. 528 (1962); the Act amended several portions of the Armed Services
Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2301-14 (1964).
71. Subsection (e), adding 10 U.S.C. 2306(f) (1964). This section is applicable only
to agencies contracting under the Armed Services Procurement Act, that is, the De-
fense Department, the Coast Guard and the National Aeronautics, and Space Ad-
ministration, see 10 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1964). Although the Act does not require this,
the Federal Procurement Regulation extends the "Truth in Negotiation" policy to the
"civilian" agencies. See 29 Fed. Reg. 10102 (July 24, 1964), and FPR §§ 1-3.807, 1-3.814.
This raises an interesting point: if the regulations are promulgated without the "bene-
fit of statute," so to speak, presumably they can be easily altered by the executive
authority which issued them, without any Congressional approval being necessary.
72. See ASPR 3-807, 7-104.29, 7-104.41, and, particularly 7-104-42; see also Item V
Defense Procurement Circular No. 57 (1967); FPR § 1-3.807; FPR § 1-3.814.
73. Sec. 8(d) Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) directs the Small Business Ad-
ministration, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of General Services to
establish and maintain a small business subcontracting program. See ASPR 1-707; FPR
§ 1-1.710.
74. ASPR 1-805 (see Item VI, Defense Procurement Circular No. 57 [1967]) and
FPR § 1-1.805 encourage the placement of subcontracts with firms which will perform
in labor surplus areas.
75. See sec. 3, 47 Star. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. § lob (1964).
76. See ASPR sec. VI, part 4.
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Security requirements
The need for such requirements is obvious. But it is worth pointing
out that they extend down into the tiers of sucontractors, vendors, and
the others.77
Contract operation and administration
The clauses and regulations relating to this field are far too numerous
to mention in complete detail. For purposes of this brief summary ref-
erence to a very few of the most important will suffice.
Change Orders. One of the most important rights the Government
reserves to itself is the right to issue change orders which (without con-
sent on the contractor's part) allow the Government to make changes
in contract performance. Without specifying details, it is obvious that
77. The contract clause for Department of Defense is found at ASPR 7-104.12. This
clause requires prime contracts to insert similar provisions in subcontracts. Important
with respect to carrying out the clause are DD form 441 (DoD Security Agreement),
1 CCH Gov'T CoNTRACTS REPORTER, para. 923.50 and the DoD Industrial Security Man-
ual, DoD 5220.22-M, 1 CCH Gov'T CoNm-icTs REPORTER, para. 905, et seq. In general,
the problem dealt with in these provisions in the safeguarding of military classified
information. The INDsUTRA. SECURITY MANUAL, iupra 53; 1 CCH Gov'T CoNTRACrs
REPORTER 915 makes clear that it is applicable to "subcontractors, vendors, or sup-
pliers of prime contractors" and para. 54, 1 CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REPORTER S 915.05,
makes clear that the Manual applies-to sub-subcontractors.
78. The standard "Changes" clause for fixed price supply contracts is in Art. 2, US.
Standard Form 32, FPR 1-16.901-32; and for fixed price construction contracts in
Art. 3, U.S. Standard Form 23A, 41 C.F.R. 1-16.901-23A. There are a variety of other
clauses, appropriate for different types of contracts, e.g. ASPR 7-203.2 for cost-reim-
bursement supply contracts. For convenience of the readers the first-mentioned clause
is reproduced:
2. CHANGES
The Contracting Officer may at any time, by a written order, and with-
out notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope of this
contract, in any one or more of the following: (i) Drawings, designs or
specifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to be specially manu-
factured for the Government in accordance therewith; (ii) method of
shipment or packing; and (ii) place of delivery. If any such change causes
an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, the per-
formance of any part of the work under this contract, whether changed or
not changed by any such order, an equitable adjustment shall be made in
the contract price or delivery schedule, or both, and the contract shall be
modified in writing accordingly. Any claim by the Contractor for adjust-
ment under this clause must be asserted within 30 days from the date of
receipt by the Contractor of the notification of change. Provided, however,
That the Contracting Officer, if he decides that the facts justify such ac-
tion, may receive and act upon any such claim asserted at any time prior
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the issuance of a change by the Government to the prime may bring
about the issuance of corresponding changes to subcontractors, and this
may be true whether or not the subcontractors grant to prime this right.
In most cases, the right will be granted in subcontracts, but it should be
apparent that, even if the prime had failed to obtain an appropriate sub-
contract clause, he may still be faced with the necessity of effecting the
change vis-a-vis his subcontractor. Consequently, the issuance of change
orders will affect subcontractors (and very possibly these effects will
be felt through many tiers). Subcontractors will also be interested in
the right (granted the prime contractor under "Changes" clauses) to
obtain an "equitable adjustment" in the price to reflect the cost of the
change.'n Effective assertion of the right to an equitable adjustment by
the prime may be the most practical recourse of the subcontractor for
payment for his own increased costs,-witness the previous "good shep-
herd" discussion.
Termination for Default. Another of the rights the Government
reserves is the right to terminate the contract when the contractor has
been delinquent in performance as defined in the clause. This will have
an inevitable effect on the business of the subcontractor. In addition,
under the clause, the subcontractor's conduct may have the effect of
excusing the prime from the impact of the default termination or im-
posing on him duties to pay excess costs or actual damages as provided
in the clause.80 Clearly, if the Government, in accord with the authority
to final payment under this contract. Where the cost of property made
obsolete or excess as a result of a change is included in the Contractor's
claim for adjustment, the Contracting Officer shall have the right to pre-
scribe the manner of disposition of such property. Failure to agree to any
adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the
meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes." However,
nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with
the contract as changed.
Somewhat related rights are provided in construction contracts when the "Suspension
of Work" clause, FPR § 1-7.601-4, is used.
79. See the provisions of the clause, supra note 78.
80. The provisions of the clause for fixed-price supply contracts are reproduced
from FPR § 1-8.707. Other clauses may be found in FPR § 1-8.708 to 1-8.710. See also
ASPR 8-707-8-711. See the governing regulations at FPR § 1-8.6 and ASPR sec. VIII, art.
11, part 6. Dqfaul1 Jauses are also found in Art. US.'Standard Form 32, FPR §
1-16.901-32; and Art. 5, U.S. Standard ForrW 23A, VPR § 1-16.901-23A. The clause isFPR § 1-8.707 reads:
§ 1-8.707 Default clause for fixed-price supply contracts.
The following clause is applicable as prescribed in § 1-8.700-2(b) (1):
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in the clause, terminates the prime contractor for default, the Govern-
ment is not responsible (privity!) for the effects on the subcontractor.
DEFAULT
(a) The Government may, subject to the provisions of paragraph (c)
below, by written notice of default to the Contractor, terminate the whole
or any part of this contract in any one of the following circumstances:
(i) If the Contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or to perform
the services within the time specified herein or any extension thereof; or
(ii) If the Contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions of this
contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger performance of this
contract in accordance with its terms, and in either of these two circum-
stances does not cure such failure within a period of 10 days (or such
longer period as the Contracting Officer may authorize in writing) after
receipt of notice from the Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
(b) In the event the Government terminates this contract in whole or
in part, as provided in paragraph (a) of this clause, the Government may
procure, upon such terms and in such manner as the Contracting Officer
may deem appropriate, supplies or services similar to those so terminated,
and the Contractor shall be liable to the Government for any excess costs
for such similar supplies or services: Provided, That the Contractor shall
continue the performance of this contract to the extent not terminated
under the provisions of this clause.
(c) Except with respect to defaults of subcontractors, the Contractor
shall not be liable for any excess costs if the failure to perform the contract
arises out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence
of the Contractor. Such causes may include, but are not restricted to, acts
of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sov-
ereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restric-
tions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather; but in
every case the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without
the fault or negligence of the Contractor. If the failure to perform is
caused by the default of a subcontractor, and if such default arises out of
causes beyond the control of both the Contractor and subcontractor, and
without the fault or negligence of either of them, the Contractor shall
not be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the sup-
plies or services to be furnished by the subcontractor were obtainable from
other sources in sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the re-
quired delivery schedule.
(d) If this contract is terminated as provided in paragraph (a) of this
clause, the Government, in addition to any other rights provided in this
clause, may require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver to the
Government, in the manner and to the extent directed by the Contracting
Officer, (i) any completed supplies, and (ii) such partially completed sup-
plies and materials, parts, tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, plans, drawings infor-
mation, and contract rights (hereinafter called "manufacturing materials")
as the Contractor has specifically produced or specifically acquired for the
performance of such part of this contract as has been terminated; and the
Contractor shall, upon direction of the Contracting Officer, protect and
preserve property in possession of the Contractor in which the Govern-
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Termination for Convenience. The right to terminate prime con-
tracts for the convenience of the Government (i.e., simply on the
ground that the Government has no further advantage in the contract)
can be effected pursuant to provisions inserted in the majority of Gov-
ernment contracts of substantial dollar value."' In return for the right
to terminate for convenience the Government agrees to pay the prime
contractor a fair price in settlement. This will include the costs of
settling subcontract claims, but, in this respect, the regulations-2 must
be consulted in order to determine the bases for settlement which the
Government will accept in dealing with the prime. Settlement is based
on the premise that the subcontractor has no contractual rights against
the Government.8 3
ment has an interest. Payment for completed supplies delivered to and
accepted by the Government shall be at the contract price. Payment for
manufacturing materials delivered to and accepted by the Government and
for the protection and preservation of property shall be in an amount
agreed upon by the Contractor and Contracting Officer; failure to agree
to such amount shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the
meaning of the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes." The Govern-
ment may withhold from amounts otherwise due the Contractor for such
completed supplies or manufacturing materials such sum as the Contract-
ing Officer determines to be necessary to protect the Government against
loss because of outstanding liens or claims of former lien holders.
(e) If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provisions
of this clause, it is determined for any reason that the Contractor was not
in default under the provisions of this clause, or that the default was ex-
cusable under the provisions of this clause, the rights and obligations of the
parties shall, if the contract contains a clause providing for termination for
convenience of the Government, be the same as if the notice of termina-
tion had been issued pursuant to such clause. If, after notice of termination
of this contract under the provisions of this clause, it is determined for
any reason that the Contractor was not in default under the provisions
of this clause, and if this contract does not contain a clause providing
for termination for convenience of the Government, the contract shall be
equitably adjusted to compensate for such termination and the contract
modified accordingly; failure to agree to any such adjustment shall be a
dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of the clause of
this contract entitled "Disputes."
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies
provided by law or under this contract.
81. No attempt will be made to reproduce these lengthy contract provisions here.
The reader is referred to FPR § 1-8.701 to 1-8.704-1; ASPR 8-701-8-704.1. The regula-
tions contain suggested termination for convenience clauses which the prime con-
tractor may insert in his subcontracts, FPR § 1-8.706, ASPR 8-706.
82. FPR § 1-8.208; ASPR 8-209.
83. See FPR § 1-8.208-1; ASPR 8 209.
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Inspection. Another of the important rights the Government re-
serves to itself is the right to inspect contract performance while it is
ongoing as well as when it is complete.8 4 Inspections may be able to be
made at subcontractors' plants or facilities under the standard clausesY5
With respect to inspections at subcontractors' places of business or at
the subcontractor "level", ASPR carefully provides:
Government procurement quality assurance actions at the sub-
contract level do not relieve the contractor of any of his responsi-
bilities under the contract and do not establish any contractual
relationship between the Government and the subcontractor .... so
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Procurement
Regulation provides in the same foresighted spirit:
All oral and written statements and contract provisions relating
to the inspection of subcontracted supplies shall be so worded as
not to (i) affect the contractual relationship between the prime
contractor and the Government or between the prime contractor
and the subcontractor, (ii) establish a contractual relationship be-
tween the Government and the subcontractor, or (iii) constitute a
waiver of the Government's right to inspect or reject supplies.8 7
RIGHTS IN INVENTIONS AND TECHNICAL DATA
It would be very far, indeed, beyond the limited scope of this paper
to cover the difficult subject of rights in inventions under Government
84. See Art. 5, U.S. Standard Form 32 (fixed price supply contracts); FPR § 1-16.901-
32; ASPR 7-103.5; Art. 10, U.S. Standard Form 23A (fixed price construction con-
tracts); FPR § 1-16.901-23A; ASPR 7-602.11. Other clauses, for different contract types,
exist, see, e.g., ASPR 7-203.5 for cost-reimbursement supply contracts.
85. All the clauses seem to recognize this right although Art. 5, U.S. Standard Form
32, supra note 84, and ASPR 7-203.5, supra note 84, do so more clearly than the other
provisions. The implementing regulation, ASPR 14-103.1, suggests that inspections at
subcontractors' plants are not to be the rule. To conduct such inspections might
raise problems in privity and discreet contract administrators will avoid such prob-
lems, where feasible. See ASPR 14-407. ASPR 14-408 seems to suggest that inspection
approval stamps can be impressed at the subcontract level. Although the regulation is
careful to specify, ASPR 14-408(c), that such stamp of approval does not constitute
acceptance, one is inclined to speculate about the psychological effect of a "com-
plete inspection approval" stamp, ASPR 14-408(a) (ii), which is intended to identify
contract or subcontract items which satisfy all contract quality requirements.
For other regulations, see FPR §§ 1-14.105-1, 1-14.108; NASA PR 14.101(a), 14.108.
86. ASPR 14-407.1.
87. NASA PR 14.108.
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prime and subcontracts. Suffice it to say that under many research and
development type primes, the contractor is obligated to include in R&D
type subcontracts the provisions of patent rights clauses. 8 These pro-
visions may obligate the subcontractor to give the Government right,
title, and interest to inventions. Where the Government is paying for
the research and development work this is clearly fair. Rights in tech-
nical data (writings, drawings, recordings which contain e.g., manu-
facturing information which a contractor or subcontractor might well
want to keep from his competitors) also may be able to be required
from subcontractors pursuant to clauses prime contractors may be un-
der an obligation to include in their subcontracts.89 This may be en-
tirely fair, of course, particularly where the Government contracts for
and pays for the acquisition of the data. The ASPR clause also at-
tempts to protect the subcontractor against the possible business dis-
advantage latent in making disclosures of data to primes or higher tier
subs who may later compete with that subcontractor90
"Flow-down" provisions
No discussion of subcontracts could omit mention of this subject.
I do not intend to detail the clauses involved,91 but only to note the
technique. That is really quite simple. The Government may require
the prime contractor to accept certain clauses in his contract and these
clauses may call for the insertion by the prime contractor in his sub-
contracts of like provisions. This sort of thing obviously may be ex-
tended down through the tiers of subcontractors. Such provisions are
said to "flow-down" and the poetry of the metaphor is apt.
SOME OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR'S REMEDIAL POSSIBILITIES
It should be emphasized at the beginning of this discussion that what
has been said previously, and what will be said below, does not reflect
88. See, e.g., ASPR 9-107.5(a), subclause d). No attempt will be made here to
analyse the NASA or AEC policies. There is a Government wide patent policy pro-
vided in the President's statement of October 12, 1963, 29 Fed. Reg. 10943-46. As to
NASA, see, in addition, sec. 305, National Aeronautics and Space Act, 72
Star. 435 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (1964); as to AEC, see secs. 151-160, as amended,
Atomic Energy Act, 68 Stat. 943-48 (1954) as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181-90 (1964).
89. See, e.g., ASPR 9-203(b) subclause (g).
90. Id.
91. The National Security Industrial Association compiled a detailed study of "flow-
down" provisions in the early 1960's. Readers might want to obtain this or a later
edition. A revised edition is being prepared at this time.
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one important situation, i.e., where the prime contractor is in bank-
ruptcy or reorganization. Adjudication of bankruptcy under the fed-
eral statutes calls for different procedures for determination of rights
and liabilities and discharge of claims than those to which we have been
referring. That separate topic is therefore put aside for purposes of this
article.
Fairness requires the observation that the Government has provided
several different avenues along which the subcontractor may proceed
for relief. These include the availability of payment bonds under the
Miller Act, 2 the ex gratia relief available indirectly in some cases un-
der "Public Law 85-804," 93 the availability of appellate "Disputes"
hearing before the Board of Contract Appeals of the Atomic Energy
Commission, 4 and the availability of direct settlement with the Gov-
ernment to World War II subcontractors under the Contract Settle-
ment Act.95 Subcontractors have also been able to look to the just
compensation remedy in the Fifth Amendment96 where the Government
has taken property of the sub (or property against which the sub has
a security right) out of the hands of the prime.7
Each of these offers (or has offered) some advantages, but none of
them, as they presently exist, offer a really sufficient solution for the
subcontractor who is interested in being paid for Government-caused
delays, changes, or other money claims arising out of the contract or
connected with it. This is the same subcontractor, it must be remem-
bered, who is subjected to manifold Government regulations and
clauses and who meets the rock-hardness of the wall of privity when
he attempts directly to assault the citadel of the Treasury.
For example: the Miller Act requires a payment bond but the amount
of the bond may not be sufficient to cover a subcontractor's claim
(whether taken by itself or in conjunction with other existing claims);
a given subcontractor may not be covered by the bond; s the bond's
92. 49 Star. 793-94 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1964).
93. 72 Stat. 972 (1958), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-35; See ASPR sec. XVII; FPR 1-17. For
subcontractor's relief, see text accompanying footnotes 103-105.
94. See discussion in the text, supra, and 10 C.F.R. Chap. 1, part 3, appendix "A."
95. See § 7(d) of the Act, 58 Stat. 655 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1964). The Act
would not apply to present day contracts, but only to "wvar" contracts, § 3(a), (b),
58 Stat. 650 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 103(a)(b) (1964).
96. U.S. Const., amend. 5.
97. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); J. F. Hodgkins Co.
v. United States, 318 F. 2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
98. Putting it in very general terms, the Act would seem to apply only to first
tier subcontractors, suppliers, vendors and materialmen, and to subcontractors, sup-
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coverage may not be such as to extend to the particular type of claim
presented by the subcontractor.9 In other words, the Miller Act pay-
ment bond may not be an adequate remedy in a specific case. And, it
ought to be pointed out, the Act relates to contracts "for the construc-
tion, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the
United States." The general practice is to require payment bonds un-
der the act only in connection with construction contracts.10 This
would leave substantially unaffected the massive array of subcontractors
under supply contracts, service contracts, and research and develop-
ment contracts.' 0 '
Public Law 85-8041.2 confers authority to grant extraordinary con-
tractual relief (by way of amendments of contracts without considera-
tion, correction of mistakes, formalization of informal contractual com-
mitments, and other actions) in order to facilitate the national defense.
The Act speaks only in terms of contracts and does not mention sub-
contracts, but indirect relief is available to subcontractors under the
Act. 03 That is, the prime contract may be amended in order to furnish
relief to a subcontractor. And, as Donald Jansen points out, there is
no reason why the Act would not permit the Government to make a
contract directly with the subcontractor to afford such relief. 0 4 It is
important to recognize that there are many conditions on relief, one
pliers, vendors, and materialmen of first tier subs, but not to subcontractors, suppliers,
vendors and materialmen of first tier suppliers, vendors, and materialmen who are not
able to be called "subcontractors." See sec. 3(a), 49 Stat. 794 (1935), as amended, 40
U.S.C. § 270(a); MacEvoy v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944). The bond would
not appear to extend below the second tier at all.
99. Where costs incurred during delays (caused by the Government) were not
able to be compensated under the terms of the prime and subcontract, see United
States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942); McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511
(9th Cir. 1966).
100. See ASPR 10-104.1(a); FPR 1-10.105-2. Authority to grant waivers (applicable
to cost-type construction contracts and to many types of contracts able to be called
"supply" contracts) from the Act was delegated by 55 Stat. 147 (1941), as amended,
by 69 Star. 83 (1955) to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Treasury
(presumably with respect to the Coast Guard).
101. For an excellent discussion of payment bonds, see Gantt, Wallick and Proctor,
Problems of Private Claimants Under Miller Act Payment Bonds, 9 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 1077 (1968).
102. See note 93, supra. The statute has been implemented by E. 0. 10789, 23 Fed.
Reg. 8897 (1958), as amended by E. 0. 11051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (1962); E. 0. 11382,
32 Fed. Reg. 16247 (1967); and in ASPR sec. XVII and FPR 1-17.
103. See Jansen, Public Law 85-804 and Extraordinary Contractual Relief, 55 GEO.
L., 959, 1011-13 (1967), reprinted in 4 Y.ARBooK OF PaocuRrazN-r ARTICLES 49 (1967).
104. Id.
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of the most notable being that relief is within the discretion of the
Government and, in general, cannot be compelled.105
It is pertinent to observe that remedies have been suggested. For ex-
ample, a statute proposing an amendment to the Small Business Act
which would permit some subcontractors to sue the United States di-
rectly has been drafted.'01 No comment or extended analysis of this
105. See Bolinders Co. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958). This decision was reached under Title II, First War Powers
Act, sec. 201, 55 Stat. 839, but the same conclusion would have to be reached, in my
opinion, under Public Law 85-804. See Jansen, supra note 103, at 1014.
106. The following is taken from H.R. Rep. No. 2341, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60
(1966):
PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON SUBCONTRACTOR's RIGHT TO SUE THE GOVERNMENT
A BILL To amend the Small Business Act
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That subsection 8(d) of the
Small Business Act (75 Stat. 646) is amended by adding at the end thereof
a new paragraph reading as follows:
5(a) Every subcontractor or supplier under a prime contract subject
to the small business subcontracting program promulgated pursuant to
this subsection, other than a contract subject to the provisions of the Act
of August 24, 1935 (49 Star. 793), who has not been paid in full for the
services rendered or supplies furnished for the performance of the said
prime contract may, after the expiration of a period of thirty days from
the date payment became due for the said services or supplies, file suit
against the United States of America for the amount unpaid at the time
of institution of such suit: Provided, however, That not less than thirty
days prior to the institution of such suit the subcontractor or supplier shall
serve upon the Attorney General of the United States, and upon the head
of the department or agency with which the said prime contract was made,
written notice of intent to bring such suit. This notice shall set forth the
basis for and amount of the claim and identify the Government contract
pursuant to which the subcontract was performed or supplies furnished.
(b) The court in which suit under this paragraph is brought shall, upon
the application of the United States of America, join all parties necessary to
adjudicate all matters in controversy in such suit. If judgment is entered
against the United States of America, the court shall also adjudicate the
right of the United States of America to reimbursement from any of the
parties so joined.
(c) Nothing contained in this paragraph shall be construed as affecting
the subcontractor's or supplier's right to sue the party with whom the
subcontractor or supplier is in privity of contract.
(d) Every suit instituted under this paragraph shall be brought in the
United States district court for the district in which the subcontractor or
supplier maintains its principal place of business, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, or in the United States Court of Claims.
(e) Upon receipt of such notice of intent to sue, the United States Gov-
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proposal is attempted here, but it might be noted that the proposed
statute would put the subcontractor in a better position than a prime
contractor inasmuch as the subcontractor could sue the Government in
a United States District Court no matter what the amount of his sub-
contract claim, whereas prime contractors may not sue the United
States in federal District Court unless the amount claimed exceeds
$10,000.'0 Then toot the proposal restricts the benefits of the new right
to sue to subcontractors and suppliers under primes subject to the small
business subcontracting program 08 and eliminates subcontracts subject
to the Miller Act.1°9 It is hard to perceive a valid reason why other
subcontractors are to be excluded.
Another proposal has been made, this time by a judge sitting in a
case involving a non-federal subcontractor's claim. In Tully & DiNapoli
Inc. v. State,"° Judge Del Giorno of the New York State Court of
Claims held that a subcontractor might not be joined as a party claimant
(mainly because of the "Wall of Privity") and suggested that modern
ernment, department, or agency shall withhold from any sums due the
prime contractor, an amount equal to the sum claimed by the subcontractor
plus two years' interest thereon computed at 6 per centum per annum
plus 10 per centum of the aggregate thereof, which sum shall be so
withheld until final determination of the suit brought thereon or until the
expiration of sixty days after the service of a notice of intent to sue and
failure to institute such suit. Such sum may be paid to the prime con-
tractor: Provided, That the prime contractor delivers to the Government,
department, or agency and to the subcontractor a good and sufficient surety
bond by an approved surety company in amount sufficient to pay the
claim with interest and court costs conditioned on payment thereof to the
subcontractor.
(f) In any event, the Government's liability to the subcontractor shall
not exceed the amount due and unpaid to the prime contractor at the
time of the service of the notice of intent to sue and in the event there is
more than one such notice served, the payments by the Government to
the extent of the sum due the prime contractor shall be paid out in the
order of the date of service of such notices and if the dates are the same
then equally between those of even date of service.
(g) Whenever the subcontractor's claim is based upon a written order
for a change or addition to the original contract or subcontract, it may
be prosecuted by the subcontractor in his own right, even though the
prime contractor has made no claim therefor, subject, however, to the
same limitations set forth in subdivision (f) hereof.
107. 62 Star. 933 (1948), as armended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2) (1964).
108. See sec. (a) of the proposal; the small business subcontracting program is pre-
scribed by sec. 8(d) of the Small Business Act, as added by 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1964).
109. See sec. (a) of the proposal; the Miller Act is found in 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935),
as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e(1964).
110. 51 Misc. 2d 11, 272 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (1966).
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day concepts might point out another result except that the right to sue
the State had not been granted to subcontractors. The Judge also sug-
gested that a statute might be prepared and, if necessary, an amendment
to the State constitution be proposed to the Constitutional Convention
then about to convene. His suggestion included some details about the
language of the statute."'
I think another possibility exists. For present purposes only a general
outline need be given, but I think this will be helpful to the reader in
evaluating the availability of remedies to cure the situation of sub-
contractors. One of the traditional remedies of the equity court was
the bill of interpleader. Stated very generally, this was a procedure
whereby a fund-holder or stake-holder was able to bring before the
court adverse claimants to the fund he held and compel them to litigate
for the purpose of establishing their rights in the fund. There were
several technical requirements"12 and, to relieve against these, equity
courts permitted what were called "bills in the nature of bills of inter-
pleader." "1 There is a Federal Interpleader Act making a liberalized
111. Judge Del Giorno's suggestion was (272 N.Y.S. 2d 667, 672):
We would also suggest to all parties involved herein, including the
State, that they work towards a change in the Statute which, in a general
way, would state: "Provided that a subcontractor or subcontractors on a
public contract have been approved by the State, such subcontractor
or subcontractors may join with the contractor in a claim which may be
filed against the State, in which he shall specify the nature of his claim,
extra work, labor and/or delays imputed to the fault, laxity or inter-
ference of the State with the contract work which resulted in damages
to him for which he demands judgment. In the event of any dispute
arising at the trial as to any items of the claim between the contractor and
subcontractor, such issue may be determined by the Court of Claims.
In the event of the failure of the contractor to proceed with the filing of
his claim or the trial thereof after it is filed, the Court, upon good cause
shown, may order the parties to try the subcontractors' claim upon which
judgment may be entered in favor of the subcontractor or subcontractors
claimants. Thereafter, the contractor may not be heard to complain re-
garding the result of said trial."
112. For a general discussion of interpleader, see 48 C.J.S. Interpleader (1963); 4
POMEROY, EQUrry JURISPRUDENcE; § 1320-29 (5th ed). JAMES, CivIL PROCEDURE, § 10.21
1965), states that there were four traditional limitations imposed on the use of inter-
pleader: (1) The same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by all the parties against
whom relief is demanded, (2) all their adverse titles or claims must be derived from a
common source, (3) the stakeholder, or the person seeking interpleader relief must
not claim any interest in the subject matter; and (4) the stakeholder must not have
incurred independent liability to the claimants.
113. For a discussion, see 48 C.J.S. lnterpleader § 7; McCLNTOCK, EQUITY, § 189
(2d ed. 1948).
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procedure available in the federal courts; 114 this is supplemented by
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules."' The remedy is a broad and useful one,
but it would appear it depends on initiation by a plaintiff seeking to
have established rights in a fund he holds or by a defendant who desires
to effect an interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim.118
It would seem apparent that the total liability of the Government
under a contract would be able to be treated, in analogy, as like the
fund involved in interpleader proceedings. The comparison is not exact,
however, because, of course, the Government's total liability may be
in many respects contingent or speculative until there is court disposi-
tion or decision by a Board of Contract Appeals of questions of lia-
bility under contract clauses or court determination of liability for
damages for breach of contract by the Government. The contract price
may not be the ceiling; under the "Changes" clause, for example, an
equitable adjustment may result in an increase of the originally stated
fixed-price.11 7 But, while the exact amount may not be able to be stated
in a given case, the Government's total liability under the contract
is able to be ascertained by proper proceedings among all the claimants
(including prime and subcontractors). This is a conceptual "fund,"
of course, but its amount can be determined in accordance with legal
principles and/or contract provisions already known. Under existing
interpleader procedures, however, it might be concluded that the Gov-
ernment would have to initiate any proceedings relating to the fund in
court. It does not appear that Boards of Contract Appeals would have
any standing to act, by way of interpleader.
Needed, therefore, would be statutory authority to meet some of the
problems suggested above. Fortunately, there is helpful statutory
"precedent", so to speak. Ancient usage in the civil code countries is
the foundation for what the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure"18 terms
114. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1964). For a related discussion, see Chaffee,
Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 HAiv. L. REv. 541-62, 929-87 (1943)
115. FEn. R. Civ. P. 22.
116. As to the defendant, see FEa. R Civ. P. 22(1).
117. E.g., art. 2, U.S. Standard Form 32, FPR § 1-16.901-32, mentioned in the text,
supra, allows change orders to be issued and requires an equitable adjustment in price
to be made to reflect any increase in lost of performance. This equitable adjustment
will normally be agreed upon and reflected in a supplemental agreement to the
contract. If an agreement cannot be reached, the matter may have to be taken to the
Board of Contract Appeals and, possibly, to the Court of Claims for ultimate dis-
position.
118. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE art. 4651-62, 9 WEST'S LSA CIvIL PROCEDURE art
4651-62. For information a few of the important articles follow (Art. 4651-52, 4656):
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
"concursus proceedings." These proceedings very much resemble inter-
pleader. But the most important point to note is the fact that the
Louisiana legislature has extended concursus by statute to proceedings
involving public contracts:
§ 2243. Petitions by authorities against claimants,
contractors and surety; preferential
payment of claimants
If at the expiration of the forty-five days any filed and recorded
claims are unpaid, the governing authority shall file a petition in the
proper court of the parish where the work was done, citing all
claimants and the contractor, subcontractor, and surety on the
bond and asserting whatever claims it has against any of them, and
shall require the claimants to assert their claims. If the governing
authority fails to file the proceeding any claimant may do so.
All the claims shall be tried in concursus and the claims of the
claimants shall be paid in preference to the claims of the governing
authority.119
Art. 4651. Definition
A concursus proceeding is one in which two or more persons having
competing or conflicting claims to money, property, or mortgages or
privileges on property are impleaded and required to assert their respec-
tive claims contradictorily against all other parties to the proceeding.
Art. 4652. Claimants who may be impleaded
Persons having competing or conflicting claims may be impleaded in a
concursus proceeding even though the person against whom the claims
are asserted denies liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claim-
ants, and whether or not their claims, or the titles on which the claims
depend, have a common origin, or are identical or independent of each
other.
No claimant may be impleaded in a concursus proceeding whose claim
has been prosecuted to judgment. No person claiming damages for wrong-
ful death or for physical injuries may be impleaded in a concursus pro-
ceeding, except by a casualty insurer which admits liability for the full
amount of the insurance coverage, and has deposited this sum into the
registry of the court.
Art. 4656. Each defendant both plaintiff and defendant; no responsive
pleadings to answer; no default required
Each defendant in a concursus proceeding is considered as being both a
plaintiff and a defendant with respect to all other parties. No exceptions
or responsive pleadings may be filed to the answer of a defendant, and
every fact alleged therein is considered as denied or avoided by effect of
law as to all other parties. If a defendant fails to answer, issue need not
be joined by default.
119. LA. STAT. § 38:2243 (1951).
[Vol. 10: 80
1968] SUBCONTRACTORS AND PRIVITY 117
Modifications to fit the federal juridical milieu would obviously have
to be made, but the heart of the statute, the use of the concursus pro-
ceeding for joinder of the parties, and the authorization for a claimant
other than the Government to file the proceeding, could be retained.
Legislative authority to entertain such proceedings could be extended
to the Boards of Contract Appeals and the federal courts.
The three proposals in the preceding several paragraphs do two
things: they indicate the need for some remedial steps concerning the
claims position of the subcontractor and they make suggestions for ap-
propriate action. I will leave it to the reader to make his own valuation;
my own indicates that legislation along the lines suggested by the
Louisiana statutes referred to above would be most promising.
